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I use an example from neuropsychiatry, namely delusional misidentification, to show
a distinction between levels of explanation and kinds of explanation. Building on a
pragmatic view of explanation, different kinds of explanation arise because we have
different kinds of explanatory concerns. One important kind of explanatory concern
involves asking a certain kind of “why” question. Answering such questions provides a
personal explanation, namely, renders intelligible the beliefs and actions of other persons.
I use contrasting theories of delusional misidentification to highlight how different facts
about the phenomenon that is being explained impose constraints on the availability of
personal explanation.
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INTRODUCTION
Neuropsychiatry involves the study of people with mental ill-
nesses in a way that makes use of the tools and understanding
of the cognitive and brain sciences. As a result, a foundational
question for neuropsychiatry is: What is the nature and extent
of the contribution that the cognitive and brain sciences can
make to our understanding of psychopathologies and mentally
ill individuals? That is why, in this paper, I use neuropsychiatry
to draw attention to two explanatory constraints. Although these
constraints are important in all areas of the cognitive sciences,
broadly construed, they are particularly visible in neuropsychi-
atry. One constraint concerns levels of explanation. The other
constraint, which is often overlooked, often misunderstood, and
is of particular importance to neuropsychiatry, concerns kinds of
explanation.
I proceed as follows. I start by contrasting three general views
about the nature of explanation, and opt for a pragmatic view. I
then introduce and characterize both the “levels” and the “kinds”
constraint within a pragmatic framework. I then illustrate the lat-
ter constraint by examining recent work on delusion. I end by
addressing an illustrative objection.
THREE CONTRASTING VIEWS OF EXPLANATION
Before looking at explanatory constraints, it is important to reflect
on what explanation is generally. Differing answers to the fol-
lowing two questions yield different views about the nature of
explanation. These two questions are:
(1) What kinds of things are the relata in explanations? (viz.
When we say that x explains y, what kinds of things are the
values for x and y? Or alternatively, what kinds of things are
the explanans and the explananda.)
(2) What is it for x to successfully explain y?
Following Faye (2007), I think it is useful to distinguish between
three kinds of views of explanation, namely: Formal-logical,
Ontological, and Pragmatic views of explanation. My aim is not to
adjudicate between these, but rather to show that the pragmatic
view provides an especially helpful way of approaching the issues
in this paper.
THE FORMAL-LOGICAL VIEW
On the formal-logical view, first and famously put forward by
Hempel (1965), an explanation is an abstract entity; in particu-
lar, it is a logically valid argument with propositional structure.
Indeed, an explanandum, according to Hempel, is a proposition
that follows deductively from an explanans. A number of things
should be noted about this approach.
(i) Scientific and ordinary (everyday) explanations are pro-
foundly different in nature. The things we call “explana-
tions” in daily life never, or at best rarely, pick out logically
related propositions.
(ii) This characterization is prescriptive rather than descrip-
tive. It is neither interested in capturing how we use the
word “explain,” nor in capturing what scientists are actually
engaged in doing when they explain things. It aims to tell
us what something ought to be if it is to count as an explana-
tion in this refined, ideal, sense. (Onemight alternatively put
this in evaluative rather than constitutive terms and say that
explanations are good explanations to the extent that they
approximate this ideal.)
(iii) Explanations are objectively “out there” to be discovered.
The formal-logical view of explanation includes a number of
views of explanation besides Hempel’s original covering-law ver-
sion. For example, it includes Salmon’s statistical-relevancemodel
as well as the unificationist theory of scientific explanation as
elaborated by Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1989).
In answer to questions 1 and 2, sets of propositions explain
other propositions, and they do so by standing in valid and sound
deductive relations to each other. Practically speaking, although
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it may apply to areas of physics, it is too demanding to usefully
apply to psychology, and it does not reflect what psychologists
actually do or ought to do. Of course, given the aim of this view
of explanation, that is not necessarily a criticism.
THE ONTOLOGICAL VIEW
On the ontological view, explanations are not made up of logi-
cally related propositions. They are made of concrete entities like,
for example, objects, states of affairs, or events. For example, you
might think that events explain other events. In particular, it is
common within this approach, to think of causes explaining their
effects. An instance of fire explains an instance of smoke.
So, in answer to questions 1 and 2 above, we get: Events (or
states of affairs) explain other events (or states of affairs), and they
do so by standing in predicable law-like causal relations.
A couple of things should be noted about this view:
(i) Again, scientific and ordinary (everyday) explanations are
different in nature. We rarely explain things to each other by
picking out law-like causal relations.
(ii) Again, explanations are out there to be unearthed. You dis-
cover them. You find a particular event, and you unearth the
explanation of that event, namely, its cause or causes.
One recent theorist, who buys into this account in philosophy of
science generally, is Woodward (2003). Another, who applies a
related view specifically to psychological explanation, is Donald
Davidson. To simplify somewhat, Davidson (1970) takes causal
relata to be not objects, not properties, but events, namely, he
takes events to cause other events. He also takes explanations to
require the picking out of a cause (which is an event) to explain
an effect (which is also an event). However, these events are only
explanatory “under a certain description.” In other words, he is
sensitive to the fact that picking out events that are causally related
is not sufficient to be explanatory: you have the pick them out
in a causally relevant way. For example, to explain why the scales
go down when weighing some plums, you appeal to the weight
of the plums, not their color, even though those are two aspects
of one and the same event (namely, the putting of purple plums
on the scales). This has some affinities with the pragmatic view.
However, we will see that, crucially, the pragmatic view opens up
the possibility of non-causal explanation.
THE PRAGMATIC VIEW
According to a pragmatic view of explanation, an explanation is
a good answer (and, we shall see, a variety of factors, both psy-
chological and objective, may contribute to this “goodness”) to
an explanation-demanding question. The relata of explanations
are not events, nor are they propositions; they are speech acts
that are heavily dependent on a number of contextual factors.
The relevant contextual factors can include a number of things
(for example, conversational context) but the most important
for our purposes are the explanatory concerns of the demander
of the explanation (which I will henceforth call “the deman-
der”). An explanation has to address the explanatory concerns
of the demander, and has to be (at least a candidate for being)
considered satisfying. This potential subjective satisfaction is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition of something being a
good explanation. Obviously, there are many objectively bad
explanations that we may wrongly consider satisfying (e.g., “just-
so stories”). So they have to be satisfying in a non-illusory way.
Different theories will flesh out what it is for something to be
“satisfying in a non-illusory way,” but, very roughly, it will mean
that it is true or accurate, which can then be cashed out in terms
of corresponding to reality, or something weaker such as “useful-
ness,” or “assertability.” The finer details of this objective criterion
are not as important for our purposes (viz. of distinguishing
the pragmatic view and introducing explanatory constraints that
are grounded in it) as the subjective criteria. These are that
the demander has to understand the candidate explanation, and
that the explanation has to address the demander’s explanatory
concerns.
Crucially, an explanation that is objectively good by the stan-
dards of either the ontological or formal-logical view, but which
leaves the demander completely in the dark, is not considered a
good explanation on the pragmatic view. Explanations are rela-
tive to a particular instance of a question being asked, and have to
cater to the demander’s epistemic state. The demander, it must be
noted, is not necessarily an individual, but could be a collective.
The “question” could be asked implicitly by the scientific commu-
nity as a whole (or a subset of that community), or explicitly by
an individual.
There are some varieties of the pragmatic view. The view was
first introduced by Van Fraassen (1980). Achinstein (1983) has
an attractive version that relies heavily on the tenets of ordi-
nary language philosophy, and Faye (2007) puts forward his own
refinements. Here is what all versions of the pragmatic view have
in common, in particular, in contrast to the formal-logical and
the ontological views characterized above.
(i) Scientific and ordinary explanation is essentially the same.
The former simply has a more regimented context (viz. the
explanatory concerns are regimented and shared across a
community, namely the scientific community).
(ii) Explanations, being the products of communicative acts, are
not discovered as pre-formed entities. They are answerable
to how things stand in the world, but they need to be selec-
tive and carefully formulated so as to be comprehensible to
the demander of the explanation. In sharp contrast to both
formal-logical and ontological views, explanations simply do
not exist in a possible world devoid of inquiring beings that
demand and give explanations. Furthermore, these expla-
nations are demanded within a wider pragmatic context,
whether it is everyday life, the court of law, the lab, or the
clinic.
So, to sum up, in answer to questions 1 and 2, explanations are
communicative speech acts, and they explain in virtue of satisfy-
ing the demander’s explanatory concerns in a non-illusory man-
ner (where “illusion” can arise at the level of truth or accuracy, or
at the level of comprehension, namely, thinking that one compre-
hends when one does not). The epistemic or informational state
of the demander of the explanation will in part determine her
explanatory concerns, and her explanatory concerns will dictate
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the kind of explanation that would be satisfying. A broadly prag-
matic view of explanation is what I will be building on for the rest
of this paper.
DIFFERENT EXPLANATORY CONCERNS ABOUT THE SAME
PHENOMENON
On a pragmatic view (in contrast to an ontological view), one
phenomenon can arouse different explanatory concerns, each of
which demand different explanations. Sometimes we have dif-
ferent explanatory concerns because we happen to be interested
in different things. At other times, however, the phenomenon
itself can impose constraints on what explanatory concerns are
suitable, namely, what questions one should ask.
Suppose there is a plane crash. One can, for example, ask for an
explanation of the plane crash in terms of poor decision-making,
or neglected obligation. Or one may ask for an explanation in
terms of technical problems with the plane; or in terms of the
weather conditions. Depending on certain facts about the crash,
either of these explanations may be unavailable. For example,
if the weather had been so extreme that even the most skilled
of pilots would have been unable to avoid a crash, then the
explanation in terms of poor decision-making is unavailable.
Conversely, if the pilot had been a terrorist who had deliberately
crashed the aircraft, then an explanation in terms of the weather
or the aircraft malfunctioning will be unavailable. Realizing the
unavailability of certain explanations is extremely important
since it should prompt us to not ask questions that have no
answers.
The crucial point is this. Certain facts about the phenomenon
that you are trying to understand can restrict what questions can
be asked, what explanatory concerns you should have, what expla-
nations will be available. Somebody looking to hold someone
accountable for a plane crash in situations where the weather was
too extreme, is asking the wrong question. This issue of asking the
right questions is extremely important in all areas of science, and
especially visible when looking at mental illness.
LEVELS OF EXPLANATION
The notion of “levels of explanation” is usually introduced with-
out any particular commitment to a general view of explanation.
However, it makes good sense to view it within a pragmatic frame-
work. Indeed, the classic mention of “levels of explanation,” in
DavidMarr’s bookVision (1982), is phrased in terms of answering
three kinds of question:
Computational theory: What is the goal of the computation, why
is it appropriate, and what is the logic of the strategy by which
it can be carried out?
Representation and algorithm: How can this computational the-
ory be implemented? In particular, what is the representation
for the input and output, and what is the algorithm for the
transformation?
Hardware implementation: How can the representation and
algorithm be realized physically? (p. 25)
Marr’s three levels makes a point that applies to any talk of levels
of explanation. It is the functionalist point of there being multiple
realizability of high-level or functional properties in lower-level
properties (e.g., the property of being a bottle-opener can be
physically realized in a number of different ways, as long as it
opens bottles). If our explanatory concerns are about the higher-
level properties (e.g., computational properties) then addressing
them by drawing attention to lower-level properties (e.g., hard-
ware properties) will be unsuitable (nevertheless, lower level
implementational properties clearly impose constraints on higher
level properties: you cannot make a bottle opener out of cream
cheese). If one has explanatory concerns that operate at a certain
level, addressing them at a different level is at best, sub-optimal,
and at worst, completely irrelevant or opaque.
Some theorists see what is called the “personal level” as just
another level in this sense: as a particular functional level where
we are talking about whole persons, what they believe, desire,
feel etc. These “personal level” properties are (if we assume
physicalism) physically implemented, but they could in princi-
ple be implemented by different physical states. Dennett’s doc-
trine of the “intentional stance” seems to view things in this
way. He presents us with the following thought experiment.
Suppose:
“some beings of vastly superior intelligence—from Mars, let us
say—were to descend upon us [. . . ] suppose, that is, that they did
not need the intentional stance—or even the design stance—to
predict our behavior in all its detail” (Dennett, 1981, p. 68).
The question then is: do these Martians miss out on anything in
failing to use the intentional stance, the personal-level vocabulary
of beliefs, desires etc.? According to Dennett, although they might
be able to predict the exact motions of the fingers and the vibra-
tions of vocal cords during an instance of a stockbroker buying
shares in General Motors, if they fail to see
“that indefinitely many different patterns of finger motions and
vocal cord vibrations—even the motions of indefinitely many dif-
ferent individuals—could have been substituted for the actual
particulars without perturbing the market, then they would have
failed to see a real pattern in the world they are observing” (1981,
p. 69).
Note that even here, with its non-reductive take-home message,
Dennett calls this “a predictive strategy.” The plan is to predict
how a causal system will behave at the relevant fineness of grain.
The finger motions are not a relevant fineness of grain for gaining
a predictive understanding of the stock market. The intentional
stance is the relevant fineness of grain for gaining a predictive
understanding of persons.
If this is correct, then the distinction between levels and
kinds of explanation that I want to put forward is unneces-
sary. There are only levels, and one level (perhaps the “top”
level) is the “personal level.” Many theorists seem to subscribe
to this view (which is somewhat encouraged by the presence of
the word “level” in “personal level”). They take the challenge of
connecting, say, a neurobiological story to a cognitive story to
be the same kind of challenge as that of connecting a subper-
sonal and a personal story. I hope to show now that this is not
the case.
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KINDS OF EXPLANATION
The pragmatic view of explanation allows there to be as many
kinds of explanation as there are kinds of explanatory concerns
(or, which comes to the same thing, kinds of questions worth
asking). And, crucially, we have explanatory concerns that are
not just causal or mechanistic. We ask questions like, “Why did
this person do that?,” “Why does this person believe that?” We
trade on the fact that there are correct and incorrect answers
to these questions, and that these answers genuinely inform us.
However, they do not do so by giving us a causal, predictive,
understanding of the situation. These questions demand personal
explanations, and personal explanations are not merely another
“level” of explanation, but a different kind of explanation.
We can illustrate the difference between the personal and sub-
personal kinds of explanation, by reflecting on different kinds of
explanation-demanding question. Roughly, whereas subpersonal
explanation is mechanistic or causal, answering “How” and “How
come” questions (respectively), personal explanation answers a
“Why” question, where “Why” is understood in a certain way.
CAUSAL AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS
Within a pragmatic view one can distinguish causal and mech-
anistic explanation in the following way. A causal explanation
merely tells you what causes what, whereas amechanistic explana-
tions is far more informative in telling how a certain phenomenon
comes about. A causal explanation provides some degree of
understanding, and a sufficient degree of understanding for some
situations, for example, if one wants to avoid a particular effect.
Thus we might establish that smoking causes cancer. We might
not know exactly how it does so, but knowing that, at least, is
enough to suggest that (ceteris paribus), if we do not want can-
cer, we should not smoke. We can think of causal explanations
as answering a certain kind of question, namely, a “How come?”
question. “How come he got cancer?” This is often expressed with
a causal use of “Why,” as in “Why did he get cancer?” This causal
use of “why” is very different from a justificatory use that we are
about to encounter.
Amechanistic explanation answers instead a “How?” question.
It provides not just the cause, but the mechanism whereby a cer-
tain causal process operates. Using the cancer example, it is not
enough to know that smoking causes cancer: what is required
is a description of the mechanism, for example, in terms of car-
cinogenic disruption of genetic material through radiation given
off by substances present in tobacco smoke. Mechanistic explana-
tion provides a greater degree of understanding thanmerely citing
causes. It is reasonable to think of mechanistic and causal expla-
nations as being the same kind of explanation insofar as the kinds
of concerns addressed are of the same kind; namely, of predicting
how a brute causal system will behave in relevant counterfactual
circumstances.
PERSONAL EXPLANATIONS
As I said, we do sometimes use “why,” when our explanatory con-
cerns are causal or mechanistic, for example, when we ask “Why
is there a hole is the ozone layer?” We mean, “By what cause or
process is there a hole in the ozone layer?” We know it is not there
for a reason. However, when we ask, “Why is there a STOP sign at
the end of that road?” we are asking for a reason, a justification, a
rationale, for its being there. Along with the distinction between
justificatory and causal uses of “why” in the question (“Why is
there a STOP sign there?/Why did you raise your hand?” vs. “Why
did he get cancer?”) we have the distinction between justificatory
and causal uses of “because” in the answer (“Because there tends
to be fast-moving traffic in the main road/Because I wanted to ask
a question” vs. “Because he smoked too heavily”). Answering such
a “why” question involves citing a person’s reasons or grounds for
believing certain things and acting in certain ways (or the general,
publicly agreed, reasons, not attributable to a specific person, as
in the case with the STOP sign).
With beliefs and actions, we often ask questions of one
another: “Why do you believe that?” “Why did you do that?” In
doing this, we are asking a very particular kind of question, and
one that requires a very particular kind of answer. This answer
is commonly called a rational explanation (Davidson, 1963).
However, “rational” has a categorical and evaluative sense. The
opposite of “rational” in the categorical sense is “a-rational” (or
“non-rational”), whereas the opposite of “rational” in the eval-
uative sense is “irrational.” The way “rational” is used here is
categorical, not evaluative. As we are about to abundantly see, you
can have rational explanations of irrational phenomena. Indeed,
something that cannot be given a rational explanation cannot be
irrational; it is merely a-rational. Consider a nervous tick. You
cannot ask why (in the justificatory sense) someone with a ner-
vous tick is behaving the way they are. And, clearly, you cannot
evaluate their reasons as bad reasons if there are none. However,
because of this ambiguity with the word “rational” I have made
the terminological decision to use “personal explanation” rather
than “rational explanation.”
If you ask me, “Why did you raise your hand?” and I answer,
“Because I wanted to ask a question,” that is normally a satisfy-
ing explanation. If I tell you a full physiological story about what
happened up until the point when my hand went up, that may
be interesting, but it is not an answer to that question. You were
after a reason. You wanted to know what I was hoping to achieve
by raising my hand. The same applies when you ask the question
“Why do you believe this?” You are after reasons for my belief, not
any mechanistic story. You want to know what grounds I have, if
any, for believing something.
IS PERSONAL EXPLANATION CAUSAL EXPLANATION?
Now, you might agree that these are common and valid explana-
tory practices. However, you might question whether there is
anything fundamentally different about them. Why are these not
causal explanations? We know that certain beliefs and desires in
certain contexts will give rise to certain actions. This seems rather
causal.
It is worth noting that there are those who are fully accepting
of the explanatory autonomy of reason-giving explanation, but
who also claim that reasons are causes. For example (unlike, say,
Anscombe, 1957 and the early Dennett, 1969) Davidson sees rea-
sons as causes. Now, although I prefer not to think of reasons as
causes, I am willing to accept for the sake of argument, that rea-
sons are causes, especially if one accepts a counterfactual theory
of causation. A counterfactual theory of causation is (roughly)
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one whereby A causes B, if and only if, had there not been A,
there would not have been B. If I had not wanted to ask a ques-
tion, I would not have raised my hand. In that very simple sense,
my desire to ask a question was a cause of my action. However, it
does not follow from something being a cause, that something is
explanatory in virtue of being a cause. Since our explanatory con-
cerns when we ask this special variety of “why” question are not
causal concerns, the explanation given in terms of reasons is not
a causal explanation, even if one thinks that reasons are causes.
In short, conceding that reasons are causes does not concede that
rational explanations (explanations in terms of reasons) are causal
explanations.
So, what are our explanatory concerns when we ask for a
personal explanation and why are they not causal? We want to
understand the person qua agent, not qua causal system. Suppose
somebody behaves in a way that, unlike a nervous tick, looks
controlled and deliberate, and yet you still cannot give it an expla-
nation. To take an unrealistic example, suppose someone holds
up a poisonous mushroom, and announces: “This mushroom is
deadly poisonous and I have no intention of killing myself” but
then pops the mushroom in his mouth. This behavior is surpris-
ing, but it is not just surprise that you feel, but perplexity and
confusion. In particular, you do not understand why this person
ate the mushroom. You can hypothesize that he was lying, either
about the poisonous nature of the mushroom, or his intentions
to stay alive. Or he was demonstrating an antidote. Or he doesn’t
know the meaning of one or more of the words he was using.
However, taken at face value, this action is perplexing. When this
happens, we are not just bemoaning a failure to predict. There is
more to it than this: we are perplexed by this person qua agent,
by the fact that we find the person unintelligible. In fact, it seems
that if his behavior can in no way be reinterpreted so as to confer
intelligibility then the best way to understand it is as a brute causal
process (perhaps he’s a realistic-looking android, programmed to
behave in just this way to prove the point I’m making here). But
explaining it in these terms would require us to ask (and answer)
a different question (“How come?” rather than “Why?”).
Other human beings often behave in ways that we have failed
to anticipate, but that are still perfectly intelligible. We might
say that, while causal and mechanistic explanations confer pre-
dictability, personal explanations confer intelligibility. Of course,
assuming that people will be intelligible makes them more pre-
dictable, in the sense that it narrows down the ways they might
behave in certain circumstances, but that does not mean that any
given personal explanation improves, or is aimed at improving,
our causal understanding of a person. Indeed, all of the causal
understanding we need is already in place: we know that certain
beliefs and desires give rise to certain actions, certain kinds of evi-
dence give rise to certain beliefs. We just want to know, in this
instance, what beliefs, or desires, or evidence the subject actually
had, so that we can understand and evaluate them as persons.
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBPERSONAL AND
PERSONAL EXPLANATIONS
We have looked at what personal explanation is, and what causal
and mechanistic subpersonal explanations are. But what is the
relationship between them? We will start by looking at how they
can compete, and then we will look at how they can inform each
other.
HOW THEY COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER
Personal and subpersonal explanations do not compete with each
other in the way that they compete amongst themselves. Within
a pragmatic framework competing explanations are competing
answers to the same question. When you compare a personal and a
subpersonal explanation, you are comparing answers to different
questions (and indeed to different kinds of questions). However,
competition comes in at a different level: at the level of asking
the question in the first place. Asking a certain question presup-
poses that it is appropriate, that it can be answered, and that
presupposes certain facts about the phenomenon in question. So,
personal and subpersonal explanations will not directly compete
(in the way that, as we are about to see, two personal expla-
nations can directly compete). However, in some cases, both of
them being offered at all will presuppose the obtaining of two
incompatible states of affairs. Two demanders of explanations
for a plane crash might ask: “Who was to blame for the crash?”
or “What kind of weather conditions caused the crash?” Each
implies different facts concerning the plane crash (e.g., the for-
mer implies that blame is to be attributed and that it wasn’t
a so-called “Act of God”). Asking a question betrays assump-
tions about the phenomenon that you are asking questions about.
We will see more on this when we look at examples from
delusion.
Another important way in which personal and subpersonal
explanations compete is by imposing constraints on one another.
If a personal explanation claims that, for example, the subject
believed that p because they had an experience with a certain
quality, but the best available subpersonal account suggests that
the experience could not have been like that, then clearly these
two explanations conflict. However, we will see that it is precisely
through this constraining that the two kinds of explanation can
inform each other.
HOW THEY INFORM EACH OTHER
We can use both personal and subpersonal explanations to fur-
ther our understanding of the same individual. To use an example
that will be relevant to us, we can ask about a patient with the
Capgras delusion the subpersonal question, “How has this brain
damage disrupted normal cognitive functioning?” A really good
answer to this will make it altogether unmysterious why (how
come) this particular damage has disrupted functioning in this
particular way, and not in any other way. This will require causal
and mechanistic explanations at different levels. However, one
can also ask, “Why (on what grounds) does she believe what she
does?” In answering this, you cannot use the same vocabulary as
when answering the first, subpersonal, question. Dopamine dys-
regulation, modular damage, etc. none of these are even the right
kind of thing to provide grounds for the subject. Similarly, to take
a non-pathological case, you might ask me:
Q: Why did you think that James was at home?
And I might answer:
A: Because I saw his car in the driveway.
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You would think it some kind of joke if I instead gave you a story
about light hitting my retina, causing activation in V1, and so on.
You want to know on what grounds I came to believe what I did.
Although subpersonal vocabulary (neurotransmitters, pro-
cessing streams and so on) cannot feature directly in personal
explanation, this is not to say that subpersonal psychology
(broadly construed to include all the cognitive and brain sciences)
cannot make very important contributions to personal expla-
nations. In particular, it can make two very different kinds of
contribution.
First, it can give us an idea of the nature of the grounds that a
subject might have (e.g., what experiences or emotions theymight
be undergoing) and how it is that they have them, or rather, how
come they have these experiences and not others. For example, as
we are about to see, subpersonal psychology can suggest that the
Capgras patient is experiencing a feeling of unfamiliarity toward
a loved one. Once we understand what the subject may be expe-
riencing, there is scope for their beliefs to be rendered intelligible,
namely, to be subject to personal explanation. We can answer the
question: “Why does the subject believe this?” In other words, the
first kind of contribution that subpersonal psychology can make
to personal explanation is one of suggesting the starting point for
such an explanation.
The second kind of contribution that subpersonal psychology
can make is very different. It may be able to warn us when per-
sonal explanation is unavailable. That is to say, it may warn us
when any attempts at understanding the subject in terms of sub-
jective grounds would be a waste of time. We saw with our plane
crash analogy that an understanding of the situation may lead
us to conclude that, for example, no blame is to be attributed.
Similarly, an understanding of certainmentally ill individuals may
lead us to realize that there is no answer to the “why” questions,
“Why did he do this?,” “Why does he believe this?” Sometimes
there may simply be no grounds for certain beliefs and behaviors,
and it is vital that subpersonal psychology can warn us when this
may be the case.
AN EXAMPLE FROM NEUROPSYCHIATRY: DELUSION
Opposing views about the nature of delusional misidentification
map on, in a nicely illustrative manner, to these two kinds of
contributions that subpersonal psychology can make to personal
explanation.
A key figure in the history of theoretical work on delusion is
Karl Jaspers, who, in his General Psychopathology (1963), claimed
that there were two very different projects: one of “understanding
the subject,” and the other of rendering the psychopathological
phenomenon causally tractable. The first project roughly corre-
sponds to personal explanation, whereas the latter corresponds
to subpersonal explanation. He thought that delusions (in partic-
ular the primary delusions of schizophrenia) arise without any
grounds or justification; they are “un-understandable” in the
sense that they are not intelligible. We cannot answer the ques-
tion: “Why (viz. on what grounds) do these subjects believe what
they do?” All we can do is try to understand the subject qua causal
system.
However, half a century later the way was paved for (at least
some delusions) to be rendered intelligible. In particular, Brendan
Maher presciently hypothesized that the “delusional belief is not
being held “in the face of evidence strong enough to destroy it,”
but is being held because evidence is strong enough to support
it” (1974, p. 99). What we then have to do as theorists is figure
out what the evidence is, and how it arises. This will obviously
have the potential to vary from one delusion to another, and may
indeed provide a satisfying explanation of why some patients have
some delusions and others have others (viz. there will be an un-
mysterious connection between the nature of their experience,
and the content of their delusion).
THE CLASSIC BOTTOM-UP MODEL
This project received something of a breakthrough (a full 16
years later) in the case of the Capgras delusion (the delusion
that one or more loved ones have been replaced by identical-
looking impostors). Borrowing Bauer’s (1984) model for facial
processing, whereby there are two streams for processing facial
information—one covert, affective and anatomically dorsal, the
other overt, semantic, and anatomically ventral—Ellis and Young
(1990) put forward the influential proposal that the Capgras
delusion can be understood as a sort of “inverse prosopagnosia.”
People with prosopagnosia have difficulty in the overt recogni-
tion of faces. Show them a picture of a familiar face and they will
not be able to tell you whose face it is. And yet, surprisingly, some
of them appear to have differential autonomic responses (roughly,
affective/emotional responses) to these faces, as measured by
heightened skin conductance response (SCR). In other words,
although they themselves cannot tell you whose face they are
looking at, their affective system seems at the very least to be able
to “tell” that it is someone familiar. Ellis and Young hypothesized
that Bauer’s two streams can be selectively impaired, leading to
double dissociation. According to them, whereas with prosopag-
nosia the affective stream for “covert recognition” is intact and
the semantic stream for “overt recognition” is impaired, with the
Capgras delusion it is the other way around. This means that the
Capgras patient is presented with someone who, thanks to intact
semantic processing, looks to them exactly like a loved one, but
there is a lack of affective response. The perceived person feels
unfamiliar and the patient therefore concludes that this person
cannot be the loved one in question. This model was given exper-
imental support (Ellis et al., 1997) when it was discovered that,
in contra-distinction to prosopagnosia, Capgras patients show
diminished SCR when presented with familiar faces.
According to this etiology, there is scope for the Capgras delu-
sion to be rendered intelligible, to be given a personal explanation,
since it can be seen as something that is inferred on the basis
of experiential evidence. These theories, which take delusions
to be grounded in unusual experiences, are called “bottom-up”
theories. A complete bottom-up account will contain a mix of
personal and subpersonal explanation. The very existence of the
anomalous experience is explained in terms of mechanism (in the
Capgras case, on the Ellis and Young model, this could involve
explaining how lesions disrupt affective processing of familiar
faces). But the judgment itself is personal. The person infers from
their experience. And the relevant question to ask is: “Why does
the person believe that this woman is not his mother?” And the
relevant answer is roughly: “Because this woman feels deeply
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unfamiliar to him.” This is not a causal, mechanistic explanation,
but a personal one. And, if correct, it tells us all we need to know
within the scope of personal explanations.
EXPLANATIONIST vs. ENDORSEMENT ACCOUNTS
However, there is a debate within bottom-up theories about what
precisely the correct answer to this question (viz. “Why does this
person believe that this woman is not his mother?”) is. Phrased in
more technical terms, there is a debate about the content of the
experience in the Capgras delusion. In other words, what exactly
does the subject’s experience tell her; how does it subjectively
support her judgment?
To borrow Bayne and Pacherie’s (2004) terminology, “expla-
nationist” accounts (e.g., Ellis and Young, 1990, Maher, 1999)
claim that the content of the Capgras patient’s experience is
something sparse like, “This woman feels strange,” and that the
delusional judgment explains the bizarre experience (roughly, the
subject reasons: “This woman, in spite of looking like my mother,
doesn’t feel like my mother would feel, therefore she cannot be
my mother”). The opposing accounts, so-called “endorsement”
accounts (e.g., Bayne and Pacherie, 2004) claim that the delu-
sional content is encoded directly in the unusual experience, and
all that suffices is endorsement of that content. The content of the
Capgras patient’s experience, on such a view, is something rich
like, “This woman is not my mother.”
Now, bracketing the plausibility of either account, it is worth
noting an explanatory trade-off. As Pacherie (2009) points out,
the explanationist account can more easily explain how the expe-
rience gets its content, since the content is so sparse. It can simply
say that there is a disruption in emotional or affective process-
ing. The task for subpersonal psychology is comparatively easy.
However, it is a bigger explanatory step from the sparse content
of the experience to the rich content of the delusion. One prima
facie problem with this is that, if the experience is sparse and non-
specific, why is there not a wider array of potential hypotheses
used to explain it? (“Maybe I don’t like mum anymore,” “Maybe
I’m tired” etc.). In contrast, the endorsement theorist can get
from the experience to the judgment just fine, since they have the
same content. However, as Pacherie puts it, where “the endorse-
ment account would appear to be weakest is in explaining how
delusional patients could have the experiences that the account
says they do” (Pacherie, 2009, p. 107). More precisely, subper-
sonal psychology needs to step in and tell us how it is that an
experience can have a rich content like, “This woman is not my
mother.”
Here we get a nice illustration of two directly competing per-
sonal explanations, namely, different answers to the very same
“why” question. It also illustrates how these give rise to two differ-
ent explanatory burdens that need to be picked up by subpersonal
explanations. Presenting the competing accounts in terms of
questions, where “Why?” and “How come?” questions correspond
to the personal (justificatory) and subpersonal (mechanistic)
questions respectively, we get (roughly) the following. For the
explanationist account we get:
Q: “Why does the subject believe that his mother has been
replaced by an impostor?”
A: “Because she feels unfamiliar to him.”
Q: “How come she feels unfamiliar to him?”
A: “Because affective processing has been disrupted in such and
such a way.”
For the endorsement account we get:
Q: “Why does the subject believe that his mother has been
replaced by an impostor?”
A: “Because his experience presents this woman as not being his
mother.”
Q: “How come?”
A: “Because (for example) subpersonal mechanisms responsi-
ble for managing the representation of the identities of known
individuals has been disrupted” (see e.g., Wilkinson, in press).
BACK TO UNINTELLIGIBILITY: TOP-DOWN ACCOUNTS
However, not everyone subscribes to bottom-up theories of delu-
sions (Eilan, 2000; Campbell, 2001). In a way that harks back
somewhat to Jaspers, these theorists claim that the delusion is
not inferred, nor grounded in evidence, but caused. Any report
(or even experimental evidence from SCR), for example, that the
mother feels unfamiliar, is a consequence of (or an accompani-
ment to) the delusional belief, but not grounds for it. She feels
unfamiliar because she is judged to not be the subject’s mother,
and not the other way around. As Campbell puts it, “‘delusion’ is
a matter of top-down disturbance in some fundamental beliefs
of the subject which may consequently affect experiences and
actions” (2001, p. 89). An upshot of this is that the belief can
only be explained subpersonally, and, of course, this leaves a
large explanatory burden for subpersonal psychology. We cannot
answer the question “Why does the person believe that this woman
is not his mother?” We cannot appeal to grounds since there
are none. We are back to Jaspers’ claim that delusional subjects
are “un-understandable.” The only question with an illuminating
answer is: “What has caused this person to believe what she does?”
This is precisely what I meant when I said that some etiologies will
take personal explanation to not be available. However, note that,
although, on these top-down theories, the delusional belief may
not be amenable to personal explanation, any action performed
on the basis of the belief will be, and this explanation will appeal
to the belief. In such a situation we roughly get the following series
of questions and answers.
Q: “Why did the patient stab her father (even though they
seemed to have a good relationship prior to the event)?”
A: “Because she believed that he was not her father, but an
identical-looking impostor.”
Q: “And on what grounds did she believe this?”
A: “There were none. The belief was merely caused.”
At this point we would need to delve into the subpersonal mecha-
nisms to understand what is underpinning the (groundless) belief
in terms of mechanisms.
AN ILLUSTRATIVE OBJECTION
Somebody might say that the “kinds of explanation” constraint is
illusory, and, in particular, that personal explanation has no place
in a scientific enterprise. When people believe things on epistemic
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grounds, or they do things for reasons, nothing fundamentally
different is going on. This could, in principle, all be explained
subpersonally by the cognitive sciences.
I think this is a misleading way to think, and I would like to
run through a thought experiment to illustrate why. Suppose we
had a “complete” subpersonal description (whatever that means!)
of what is going on, say, in an instance of thought insertion. We
are not appealing to anything personal, we are not talking about
grounds or reasons, just mechanistic stuff. Assuming physical-
ism, and highly advanced imaging techniques at our disposal, we
could, in principle, take any given individual and see when they
would (and when they would not) report inserted thoughts. I am
very happy to grant this. Thought insertion is, in a rather trivial
sense, a fundamentally physical phenomenon. However, suppose
that it happens that thought insertion, the denial of ownership of
one’s thoughts, is actually grounded in a very bizarre experience.
We could know exactly what is going on in the brain of someone
(i.e., we know what that neural activity looks like on the scanner)
who is reporting inserted thoughts, but still not know on what
grounds they are denying ownership of their thoughts (or indeed
that there are grounds at all). This seems like a possible epistemic
state for us, as scientists, to be in. More worryingly, it entails igno-
rance of an important and irreducible fact (by “fact,” I mean, a
claim that is determinately true) namely, concerning the grounds
on which somebody is denying ownership of her thoughts.
As the section in this paper that examines the relationship
between personal and subpersonal explanations makes clear, I am
not denying that we could work out, to some extent, the sub-
ject’s experiential grounds from subpersonal data. Here, I have
advocated the fruitful, but careful, contribution of subpersonal
psychology to personal explanation. But this in itself requires us to
take personal explanation seriously. In this thought experiment,
personal explanation is disregarded, eliminated, out of bounds.
And the intuition I hope you share is that this entails a kind of
ignorance.
Of course, where this illustrative objection goes awry is in
making the fallacious step from physicalism to reductionism.
Everything in the universe could well be made of physical stuff,
but as human beings we are constrained, partly by our interests
and concerns, and partly by our cognitive and conceptual limita-
tions. We therefore talk about, and explain, many different things
(and kinds of things) in many different ways (and kinds of ways).
Obviously, there are facts concerning people that go beyond, and
are not reducible to, neural facts. There are epistemic facts (facts
about grounds for belief), motivational facts (facts about people
doing things for reasons). There are also facts about what peo-
ple experience (it is, for example, a fact, as unambiguously true
as anything, that I am currently not in excruciating pain). And it
does not stop there: there are social facts, economic facts, contrac-
tual facts, and so on. You cannot capture what it is for me to sign
a contract using physics and physiology.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, I built on a pragmatic view of explanation, on
the basis of which explanations are answers to explanation-
demanding questions, in order to show a distinction between
levels of explanation and kinds of explanation. Different kinds
of questions, and hence explanations, arise because we have
different kinds of explanatory concerns. One important kind of
explanatory concern involves asking a certain justificatory kind
of “why” question. Answering this kind of question provides a
personal explanation, namely, renders intelligible the beliefs and
actions of other persons. I then used contrasting theories of delu-
sional misidentification to illustrate how different facts about the
phenomenon that is being explained impose (i) constraints on
the availability of personal explanation and (ii) leave different
explanatory burdens for subpersonal psychology (broadly con-
strued). More generally, this also illustrated how asking certain
kinds of questions, seeking certain kinds of explanations, carries
implicit assumptions about the nature of the phenomenon about
which the questions are being asked.
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